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Economic and Causation Issues
in City Suits Against
Gun Manufacturers
Frank J. Vandall*
I recently heard Ted Turner speak and he said that when he used to make
presentations at college campuses around the country on nuclear disarmament, he
would ask, "How many of you would like to die in a nuclear holocaust?"' He
reported that no hands were ever raised.2
How many of you would like to have your children shot? The United States
is the most violent democratic country in the world.' One child dies every 92
minutes from gunshots, an average of over 15 children each day.4 Approximately
35,000 people perish from gunfire every year.' There were 9,390 gun-related
homicides in the United States in 1996, but only 30 in Great Britain and 15 in
Japan. This epidemic of violence has been largely ignored by American society
until recently when numerous cities filed suits against gun manufacturers.' The
focus of this article is the economic implications of the suits, as wells as the cause
in fact and proximate cause issues that the city suits will face.
*. Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; B.A., 1964, Washington and Jefferson
College; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin. I
appreciate the research assistance of Jennifer Joy Dickinson. Mistakes are mine, however.
1. Ted Turner, "Future Makers", Speech at Emory University, Feb. 9, 1999.
2. See id.
3. Chelsea Carter, U.S. Leads Richest Nations in Gun Deaths, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 17, 1998.
4. See Studies Assess Lethal Toll of Gun Violence, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS, Apr. 15, 1996 at
5 (noting that of 5,751 gunfire deaths of children in 1993, 957 of those killed were under fifteen years
of age).
5. See Bill Rankin, Cities Firing Back at Gun Industry, Tobacco 11, Lawyers See Courtroom
Assault on Makers of Firearms as a Payback Bonanza for Crime in the Streets, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Nov. 29, 1998, at Al.
6. See Carlos Campos, Litigation Won't Fix Problem, Some Say, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 5,
1999, at A12 (reporting on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms study).
7. Suits have been brought by the cities of Atlanta, Bridgeport, Chicago, Miami, and New Orleans
to recover the costs of dealing with gun-related violence.
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I. ECONOMIC ISSUES
These suits are an attempt to internalize an extremely costly externality.8 If
you believe in the free market system, the intersection of the supply and demand
curves determine the price of a product.9 Raw goods, in part, determine the cost
to make a product in the United States. Therefore, the steel and labor that goes into
making guns must be taken into account to determine the overall cost. The new gun
suits seek to place the social costs of guns (death and destruction) on the gun
manufacturers so that the purchase price of a gun reflects the real price, not one
that has been subsidized.' Torts is a very simple subject; it is about damages and
there is always a winner and a loser. But, who should bear the loss? In a tort
claim, someone always bears the loss.
Presently, the individuals bearing the loss in handgun violence are the
taxpayers and businesses in our communities. " What the cities are finally realizing
and saying is "we don't think that cost should be on our shoulders."' 2 Cities are
determining that the cost of handgun violence should not be passed on through
increased taxes to citizens and businesses within their community," but should be
borne by gun manufacturers. 4 This concept is worthy of further consideration.
Supposing that these suits are successful, what will happen? There is the chance
that nothing will happen, but a few cities may follow in their brethren's footsteps
and cause manufacturers to absorb the cost.
Another option is that the price of guns will be increased to reflect the damage
they cause. 5 For example, gun manufacturers would determine which guns are
costing the company the most in damage awards and would therefore, increase the
price of those specific guns to offset the damage awards.'3 For example, consider
the Saturday night special." Following the above theory, one would therefore
8. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. &ECON.
191, 201-04 (1996) (arguing that liability should be based on profit of gun manufacturers and not on
the amount of harm to the victim).
9. See RoY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONoMics 50-52 (5th ed.
1993).
10. See Kaplow, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. See Julie B. Hairston,Atlanta Officials at Odds Over Next Cuts in Budget, Reduction Revenues
Pinches City, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 12, 1998, at B4. In a good number of urban centers, many
middle class taxpayers, who make up the bulk of the tax base, have left for suburban neighborhoods,
causing a deterioration of city services and higher taxes. See id. One reason for the flight to the
suburbs is fear over gun related violence. See id.
12. See Kaplow, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
13. See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54 (Md. 1985).
14. The Saturday Night Special is a small handgun that is cheap, easily concealed and extremely
unreliable. See id. at 1154. Gun salespeople describe Saturday Night Specials as "ghetto guns." See
id. at 1158.
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expect the price of these guns to increase in light of the amount of damage they
cause in the cities. Using similar rationale, cigarette manufacturers recently
increased the price of cigarettes by forty-five cents per pack to fund settlement
payments. "
Additionally, these suits could result in the redesigning of guns. The
manufacturers may say, "If theft or misuse of the gun is a problem, we can change
the design."'6 Since the filing of these suits, many theories are now being espoused
on howto make guns safer. 7 The idea of gun personalization is the basis of many
of these theories. 8 Consider that many of you drove today and you locked your
cars. 9 Because of the key, you believe that there is a good chance that you will
find your car where you left it. With guns, however, there are no keys, but they
should be the most likely candidates for such personalization.2 °
One suggestion has been made that would require gun owners to wear
bracelets with computer chips in them that match a computer chip in their gun.2'
If both chips are not present or don't match, the gun is inoperable.22 Additionally,
commentators have also proposed the use of a break-off hammer. 3 The hammer
is easily removed from the gun, can be stored for safety and security reasons and
can be easily reattached to the gun for appropriate use.24 Presently, no concrete
efforts have been made to apply any of these safety and preventative advances to
15. Barry Meier, Cigarette MakersAnnounce Large Price Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at A20
(reporting that due to settlement, Philip Mortis and R.J. Reynolds were raising the prices of cigarettes);
Cigarette Prices Rise Sharply in Wake of States' Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POsT, Nov. 24, 1998, at
A5 (quoting tobacco analyst statement as saying that the reason for the cigarette price increase was "to
fund the settlement payment").
16. James Bennet, Gun Makers Agree on Safety Locks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at A I (discussing
how technology can prevent thieves from stealing guns and using them in crimes and accidental deaths
caused by misuse).
17. See id.; see also Kit R. Roane, The Latest in Safety: "Smart" Guns That Know Their Owners,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at N.J. 8 (discussing the use of matching microchips in both the stock of
the gun and in a bracelet or ring worn by the owner, so that only the owner can use the gun).
18. See Roane, supra note 17.
19. If not, then perhaps one might need to reflect on the wonderful movie Ferris Bueller and wonder
where your car is. Hopefully, none of you drove your Ferrari today.
20. See Bennet, supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Roane, supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
21. See Roane supra note 17.
22. See id.
23. See Joseph Hallinan, Firm Aims at Gun Safety Market with Removable Hammer, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 12, 1999, at IC (noting the invention of a pistol hammer than can be snapped in two to
make the gun inoperable).
24. See id.
guns.25
Gun manufacturers may find that it is not cost effective to redesign a particular
gun and may withdraw it from the market.26 In a related context, the Ford Pinto
suffered such a fate. The Pinto had a little design problem; the car tended to
explode when hit in the trunk.27 Ford changed the car's name to Bearcat, put a
piece of plastic between the differential and the tank, sold it through Lincoln
Mercury dealers for a year, and then finally took it off the market.2" Perhaps the
gun manufacturers will follow the lesson Ford learned and remove their product
from the market.
Small gun manufacturers might file for bankruptcy, but before doing so, they
should carefully analyze the plight of the asbestos manufacturers. After several
asbestos manufacturers filed for bankruptcy, a board was appointed to run the
corporations during the bankruptcy period.29 The board of governors for the
asbestos manufacturers consisted of plaintiffs attorneys.3° Can you imagine
anything worse for a corporation than having it run by plaintiffs' attorneys? It is
likely that gun manufacturer bankruptcy could create the same situation.
Additionally, gun manufacturers may spend enormous amounts of money on
advertising and lobbying for more protective laws in ways similar to those
undertaken by the cigarette industry.31 For example, in response to the gun
manufacturer suit filed by the city of Atlanta, the National Rifle Association took
great pride in pointing out that the Georgia legislature, within days of the suit,
passed a bill forbidding cities to sue gun manufacturers.32 It was indecorous for the
NRA to act so quickly. One would think that they would have waited one or two
25. Additionally, what has worked so far is the creation of tighter controls over who can purchase
guns. One such control mechanism is the Brady bill, which has been successful at keeping a large
number of felons out of the gun purchasing arena. See White House Press Paper: Keeping Guns Out
of the Hands of Criminals, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4636812.
26. Likely candidates for market withdrawal include the Saturday Night Special and automatic
firearms.
27. Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1016-17 (1991).
28. See id. at 1019. It is interesting to note that the cost of the Ford Pinto increased by only ten
dollars after its redesign following litigation. See id. at 1060.
29. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 470-471 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that businesses faced with large debts will often choose to
reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent having to liquidate their assets).
30. See id.
31. See Gunmaker's First Volley in War on Suits: State Lends Its Support, CHI. TRIB.,Feb. 9, 1999,
at 6 (discussing the push by gun manufacturers to obtain protective laws against gun manufacturer
suits).
32. See Kathy Pruitt, Blocking of Gun Suit Now Law, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 10, 1999, at B 1
(reporting that Governor Roy Barnes signed a bill into law blocking the city of Atlanta's lawsuit against
gun manufacturers potentially bringing an end to the legislative battle over the right of any local
government to bring a product liability suit against gun manufacturers); see also Bruce Alpert, Morial
Targets Guns on Washington Trip, NEW ORLEANSTIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 25,1999, at A19 (discussing
Representative Bob Barr's (R-Ga.) plans to introduce legislation that would ban cities and states from
filing lawsuits against gun manufacturers for gun violence).
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months before "calling in their chips", so there was some doubt as to who was
running the Georgia legislature. It is now crystal clear that the NRA is at the helm.
It is also clear what will happen to gun violence issues entrusted to the Georgia
legislature.
II. CAUSATION
Cause in fact poses an interesting problem in gun manufacturer liability.
Denise Dunlevy33 has done a wonderful job touching on that issue regarding the
case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.34 In Sindell, a twenty-year-old developed
bladder cancer due to the DES administered to her mother during pregnancy.
However, there was no way to prove who manufactured the pill that her mother
ingested 20 years earlier.36 The court held that the DES manufacturers would be
held liable in proportion to their market share. 7
The Sindell case involved a suit brought by individuals, but the market share
theory could work equally well with regard to current gun litigation. The city gun
manufacturer suits concern damages brought about by thousands of murders,
intentional shootings, robberies, and other similar gun-related crimes. Because it
is not possible to show how many of the guns used were Smith and Wesson,
Remington, etc., the market share standard of liability is well suited for determining
liability in these suits.3"
Unlike the DES cases, gun manufacturer suits have an additional variable that
requires consideration. Many of the gun manufacturers which have large
percentages of the market manufacturer a gun that is not desirable for use in violent
crime. For instance, Remington may manufacture a shotgun that is extremely
valuable, but only as a collectible. 9 Therefore, Remington's defense attorney
would move to dismiss.'n However, the manufacturers of easily concealed
handguns would not be dismissed but would be held liable.4 Therefore, the
33. Denise Dunlevy is the lead plaintiff's attorney in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek and a member of the
afternoon panel.
34. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
35. See id. at 926.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 937-38.
38. Because it will be difficult to determine exactly which and how much each gun manufacturer's
product contributed to gun related violence, the market share theory is able to make recovery by the
cities much easier.
39. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing numerous
gun manufacturers from suit).
40. See id.
41. See id.
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holding of Sindell is going to be important in the municipal suits.42
When an individual sues a cigarette manufacturer, there is an opportunity to
argue that there are environmental and genetic reasons for the development of lung
cancer.43 The argument can be made that the plaintiff is genetically predisposed to
developing cancer and that bad genes, not cigarettes, were the cause.' A great deal
of money is spent in cigarette litigation attempting to prove the existence of other
causes for a plaintiff's cancer.45 In handgun litigation, as with cigarette litigation,
the larger the group, the more powerful the statistics. Several of the gun
manufacturer suits, like those brought by Chicago and New Orleans, concern
thousands of cases of gun related violence; therefore, their cases are more easily
made based on the power of statistics.46 The cities will be able to show demo-
graphically how many and which guns were involved in acts of gun-violence and
can then determine percentage of liability per gun manufacturer.47 The statistics
work more powerfully in favor of the municipalities than they do in a case like
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek4 s
Proximate cause is a challenging subject and gun manufacturers will argue
that the responsible party is the person who pulled the trigger.49 Certainly, this is
how the person on the street thinks; that the person who pulls the trigger is the only
responsible party. There are, however, a number of valuable cases that have
examined the scope of liability under the proximate cause doctrine, including
Richardson v. Ham"' and Hergenrether v. East.52 The likely gun manufacturer
defense is, "We could not foresee that this gun would be used by a criminal to
shoot someone; therefore, we should not be held liable."53
42. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
43. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: the Application ofAbsolute Liability
to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 429-30 (1991) (highlighting problems faced by
individual plaintiffs who bring suits against tobacco companies).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See generallyNOEL A. C. CRESSIE, STATISTICS FOR SPATIAL DATA (1993) (discussing various
ways to analyze spatial data); see also PAULNEWBOLD, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS ANDECONOMICS (4th
ed. 1995) (analyzing use of statistics and their methods).
47. See generally id.
48. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 72-80
and accompanying text.
49. See No Smoking Gun/Case Against Gun Industry Will be Hard to Prove, HOUS. CHRON., Jan.
28, 1999, at A22 (arguing that recklessness of gun owners is unforeseen superceding cause of gun
violence).
50. In several letters to the editor, people have argued that the "bottom line with guns is
responsibility" of the owner. See e.g., Joel Kilthau, Editorial, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 2, 1998, at
A14. Similarly, the oft quoted expression "guns don't kill people, people kill people" echoes the
responsible owner theory that most laymen ascribe to. See Jeff DeBord, Letter to the Editor, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., June 12, 1998, at A18.
51. 285 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1955).
52. 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964).
53. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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In the Richardson case, an owner of a bulldozer left the bulldozer parked on
a cliff with the keys in it. 4 Some boys came along, fired it up, drove it over the
cliff, and it went down the hill and ran into the plaintiff's house.5 The plaintiff
brought suit against the owner of the bulldozer. 6 There are few things more
exciting to a young person than climbing on bulldozers, which naturally leads to
the next step of trying to fire it up. Recognizing this, the Richardson court held the
owner of the bulldozer liable, finding that it is foreseeable that kids would get on
the bulldozer and attempt to start it."
Similarly, in Hergenrether, a driver of a pick-up truck filled with expensive
plumbing supplies left the pick-up parked in a dangerous part of town with the key
in the ignition. After stealing the truck, the thief ran into the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff brought suit. 9 The court held that owner of the pick-up could foresee that
a thief would steel his vehicle.' °
While Hergenrether involved liability of an owner and not a manufacturer,6
there are many situations where a manufacturer is held liable for the damage it
causes even though there are others involved later in the chain of causation.62 This
is particularly true in the area of environmental litigation. That is, a steel
manufacturer pollutes the air and pollutes the water. Since 1972, manufacturers
have been required to ensure that the air and water are not polluted.63 Large
54. See Richardson, 285 P.2d at 270.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Richardson, 285 P.2d at 272 (relying on RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 449). "If the realizable
likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard.., which makes the actor
negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent
the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." Id.
58. See Hergenrether, 393 P.2d at 165.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 167.
61. One could argue that the owner of the pick-up truck, like the owner of a gun, was a superceding
cause, thus breaking the chain of causation. However, this defense did not work in Richman v. Charter
Arms, 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd by Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1985), which denied summary judgment to a gun manufacturer by finding that a criminal intervening
cause does not automatically relieve manufacturers of liability. See Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 205-06.
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985)
determined that a criminal act did act as a superceding cause thereby cutting off the gun manufacturer's
liability, implicitly overruling Richman. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268. See also Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek*, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that gun manufacturer was not entitled to summary
judgment on the same grounds as Richman).
62. See infra notes 75-80.
63. See John W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and
Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225,227 (1995) (noting that a single toxic waste cleanup
costs the steel industry approximately $25 million).
amounts have been spent by manufacturers to eliminate the pollution and the price
of steel reflects that cost.' Similarly, toxic chemical manufacturers contribute to
a superfund. When there is a spill of those toxic chemicals, the governmental fund
comes into play. The fund provides for the costs of clean up and those costs are
then charged back to the manufacturer.65 The manufacturer is the logical source if
you want a quick response to toxic spills.
There is a legal theory that summarizes this analysis. Judge Guido Calabresi
has a theory known as the cheapest cost avoider theory:66 the person should bear
the loss who is best able to evaluate the loss and do something about it.67 In gun
litigation, the party who is best able to evaluate the loss and is able to do something
about it, in most of the cases, is the gun manufacturer.68 Certainly, in the
oversupply situation to which Denise Dunlevy refers, and in defective gun cases,
the gun owner is not the appropriate person to ask to redesign the gun or to stop
over-saturating the market. The logical alternative is therefore the gun manufac-
turer.
Im. Two TIDE SHIFTING CASES
Two recent cases have affirmed the existence of gun manufacturer liability and
may foreshadow the future. Both are suits by individuals, not municipal suits.
However, they manifest that the courts are now prepared to deal with gun violence.
The first case, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 69 dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of fraud and
products liability, but not the claim of "collective and individual liability for
possible negligence in merchandising handguns in a dangerous manner."7 The
plaintiffs claimed negligent marketing, on the theory that current handgun
marketing "fostered the growth" of a handgun black market.71 In its discussion of
the plaintiff's negligence claim, the Hamilton court noted that New York
recognized several alternative theories to the causation requirement, including:
64. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 546, 606 (1987) (discussing how the increase in environmental regulations forced the United
States steel industry to demand higher tariffs on foreign imports to maintain competitiveness).
65. See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (C.E.R.C.L.A.)
§9607, 42 U.S.C.A. 103 (1999).
66. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972) (discussing the theory
that laws should place liability on those best able to analyze and correct the problem).
67. See id.
68. Unlike the consumer, gun manufacturers have the economic and political ability to re-engineer
their products to make them safer, to track the overall purchases, use, and misuse of their products, are
best able to bear the cost and therefore are the cheapest cost avoiders.
69. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
70. Id. at 1314.
71. See id. Plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer's lax supervision of and control over their
products amounted to a tort in negligence. See id. at 1316.
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alternative, enterprise, concerted action, and market share liability.72 These
collective theories of liability rely on the existence of unique circumstances that
"make it impractical to prove which defendant caused the injury,"73 tortious
conduct by all defendants that could have resulted in plaintiff's injury,74 problems
of proof relating to the conduct or product," and no other suitable remedy.76 In
applying the law of collective liability to the plaintiff's case, the court determined
that the market share theory would be the most viable, provided that plaintiff could
produce the necessary evidence.77 Thus, municipal suits may be able to avoid
difficult causation requirements by relying on Hymowitz.7 s
Perhaps the most important recent case dealing with gun manufacturer liability
is Merrill v. Navegar, Inc..79 On July 1, 1993, Gian Ferri entered a high rise office
building in San Francisco with two TEC-DC9 semi-automatic assault weapons
manufactured and distributed by the defendant, Navegar. s° Ferri murdered eight
people and wounded six others before taking his own life."'
Because of its weight and fire power ability, 2 the TEC-DC9 was best suited
and designed for engaging multiple targets during rapid sustained fire.83 A study
identified the TEC models as the most favored weapon of the most dangerous
criminals and are twenty times more likely to be used for criminal purposes than
conventional weapons.' Navegar was aware that their product was "disproportion
72. See id. at 1327. Enterprise liability involves holding all manufacturers liable where the
individual manufacturer cannot be identified but the entire industry "jointly controlled the risk." See
id. For a discussion on market share liability, see supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 1329 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073-75, cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989)).
74. See id. (citing Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
75. See id. (citing Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1331.
78. 539 N.E.2d at 1069.
79. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted and opinion superceded by 991 P.2d
755 (Cal. 2000).
80. See id. at 152.
81. See id. Ferri held a grudge against a law firm occupying several floors of the high-rise. See id.
He began his shooting spree on the 34th floor and systematically moved down two of the other floors.
See id.
82. See id. at 153. The TEC models and others like them have been found to have no value as
hunting, self-defense, recreational shooting, or target firearms. See id.
83. See id. at 154.
84. A Cox Newspaper analysis of 1988 BATF data found that "due to its unsurpassed firepower,
concealability, and low price" the TEC-9 was a favorite among violent criminals. See id. at 155
(quoting James Fox, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University). Additionally,
the Cox report identified that semi-automatic assault weapons, while accounting for only ten percent
of the total gun population, represented the weapon of choice in ninety percent of crimes in which guns
were used. See id. Only ten gun models comprised this staggering figure and the TEC models used in
ately associated with criminal activity, '"" and capitalized on this by deliberately
marketing their products to military and survivalist types, 6 advertised in magazines
with California distribution, loaned their guns for use in violent films, and, in
violation of federal gun laws, aggressively marketed the fact that the TEC models
could be easily converted to automatic assault weapons.8 7 Perhaps the most
damaging evidence against Navegar was the fact that the National Sales Director
acknowledged that when news reports cited the TEC models in connection with
violent crimes, sales went up and the media attention was both flattering and
profitable."8
The trial court granted summary judgment in Navegar's favor because "the
common law has thus far declined to impose liability for injuries caused by a third
party using legally manufactured and distributed firearms." 9 The California Court
of Appeals determined that the issue on appeal was "the existence.., of Navegar's
duty and.., the evidence that its allegedly negligent activities were a cause-in-fact
of appellants' injuries."90 The cause of action was for negligent advertising and
marketing.9' The appellate court found that there was evidence that could support
ajury's conclusion that Navegar over-promoted its product to a violent audience.92
The court began its inquiry by examining the duty prong of the negligence
formula.93 While the trial court found that no duty existed under the test set forth
one out of every five crimes involving gun violence. See id.
85. Id. (quoting James Fox, Dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University).
In a later portion of the opinion, the court distinguishes Merrill from Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp.,
1996 WL 276830 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See id. at 182. Casillas also dealt with a Navegar semi-automatic
pistol that was disproportionately associated with criminal activity. See id. at 181. In Casillas, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Navegar for the same reason it was granted in Merrill;
because California "would not allow a [negligence] claim against a third party's illegal use of a legal
and non-defective firearm . I.." Id.(quoting Casillas, 1996 WL 276830 at *4). The court distinguished
Merrill from Casillas by stating that no admissible evidence as to whether Navegar was aware that their
product was disproportionately associated with criminal activity existed in Casillas, but there was
ample evidence in existence in the present action. See id. at 182. Additionally, there was ample
evidence in the present case to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether "Navegar's conduct in
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the TEC-DC9 was a substantial cause of plaintiffs
injuries." Id. It is believed that this will be a critical distinction to be made in future gun manufacturer
suits.
86. See id. at 156.
87. See id. at 156-57.
88. See id. at 157.
89. Id. at 160.
90. Id. at 161. The court stated that a determination of ordinary negligence required a showing of
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. See id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, 164-165 (5th ed. 1984)).
91. See id. at 162.
92. See id. at 184-85.
93. Id. at 161-85.
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in Rowland .v Christian,94 the court of appeals' assessment yielded a different
answer.95 The court, in noting that plaintiff had chosen not to assert a duty based
on special relationship, 96 extended the holding of Knight v. Jewett,7 which held
that a defendant has a general duty to ensure that the inherent risks associated with
a sport are not increased by the type of play.98 The Merrill court found that the
attributes and inherent dangers of sports were analogous to those present in gun
use,99 that the duty analysis was the same under both assumption of risk and
negligence.l" Additionally, the court was able to skirt the special relationship issue
present in Knight, usually required in finding duty, by determining that the special
relationship standard is only required where the conduct was unintentional and the
risk was not clearly foreseeable.1' If with military-style weapons the misfeasance
was intentional and the high degree of harm was foreseeable, then special
circumstances exist, which preclude the necessity of finding a special
relationship. 2 The special circumstances are the military nature of the TEC-9 and
the advertising to people who are likely to misuse the gun.' °3
After establishing that Navegar had a duty to ensure that the risk associated
with firearms was not increased, the court tackled the difficult issue of foreseeabili-
ty of harm."° With regard to gun manufacturer suits there are several difficult
issues, including how to contend with the general rule that no duty to control a third
party (the shooter) exists unless a special relationship is present, and whether a
94. 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (superceded by statute as stated in Perez v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.,
267 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Cal. App. 1990)). Rowland held that the test for whether one owed a tort duty
depended on a variety of factors, including "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, [and] the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct ..
Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (quoting Rowland, 443 P.2d at 113).
95. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165.
96. See id. at 161-62. The court stated that framing a duty argument on the existence of a special
relationship is the standard argument for gun manufacturer liability. See id.
97. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). Knight concerned a plaintiff who was injured during a touch football
game and involved the "interplay of the doctrines of assumption of risk and comparative fault." Merrill,
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163 (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 703).
98. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164 (citing Knight, 834 P.2d at 707-09).
99. See id. at 164. "Sporting activities, like handguns, are inherently dangerous in a variety of
ways, but they are viewed as socially desirable and useful, and are therefore permitted to be free of the
general duty to eliminate all integral risks of harm." Id.
100. See id. 164-65.
101. See id. at 164-65 (citing Pamela L v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980)).
102. See id.
103. See id
104. See id. at 165.
729
criminal act is foreseeable.° 5 The court alleviated the first concern by noting that
the duty existed because of special circumstances, therefore, the correct determina-
tion was to look generally at whether Navegar's negligent conduct (the over-
promotion) was "sufficiently likely" to result in someone seeking to injure or kill
others with Navegar products. °6 Based on Navegar's media campaign and their
knowledge that their product was the "weapon of choice" for violent criminals," 7
the court established foreseeablity of harm.' ° The small, easily-concealed nature
and rapid-fire character of this killing machine with a sling, spoke volumes.
Because the court determined that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was
foreseeable, the general rule that there is no duty to control the acts of third parties
(shooters) was deemed inapplicable."° The court analogized the case at bar to
Richardson v. Ham"' and found Navegar's knowledge of the prevalent criminal
misuse of their product and their media campaign, which "invited or enticed"
persons likely to misuse the weapon to acquire it, amounted to a finding that
Navegar had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect third parties."' Turning
to the issue of foreseeable criminality, the court stated that California rejected the
blanket rule that criminal acts are superceding causes," 2 by adopting the Restate-
ment view that if there is a "realizable likelihood" of a third party's criminal act,
then liability flows from that act and is not cut off."3 The court recognized that the
marketing of the TEC-9 was not compatible with the marketing of handguns or a
hunting rifle." '4
In discussing Navegar's duty to the plaintiffs, the court determined that
Navegar's conduct was morally blameworthy. "' Additionally, the court relied
upon the existing social policy of preventing future harm due to gun-related
105. This determination exists where no special relationship is present. Because the court chose to
frame Navegar's duty in terms of special circumstances, it was necessary to determine whether Navegar
had the duty to control the acts of third parties. See id. at 168-69.
106. See id. at 165-66 (relying on Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 628, n.6 (1986)). Additionally,
the court noted that where duty is based on a special relationship, liability exists only where there is a
specific risk of harm. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University
of California, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (1976)). The Merrill court also stated that the "target of the risk is an
identifiable and foreseeable victim." Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166, n.9 (quoting Hooks v. Southern
Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 165 Cal. Rptr. 741, 746 (1980)).
107. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
108. See id. at 167.
109. See id. at 168.
110. 285 P.2d 269; see also supra notes 54,57-60 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson).
111. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169; see also id. at 168-69 (discussing the duty analysis).
112. The Merrill court cites numerous cases as standing for this proposition. See id. at 169.
113. See id. at 169 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449). The court found that "the
likelihood that a third person would make use of the TEC-DC9 in the kind of criminal rampage Ferri
perpetrated is precisely the hazard that would support a determination that Navegar's conduct was
negligent." Id.
114. See id. at 166.
115. The court found that Navegar's indifference to the criminal misuse of their product proved that
their conduct was morally blameworthy. See id. at 169.
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violence;'1 6 specifically, that the imposition of a duty not to over-promote gun sales
and the resultant liability from its breach would not unduly interfere with any
societal interest in firearms." 7 The court also found that statutory compliance
didn't shield Navegar from a finding of negligence, especially considering that
there was no intent by the legislature to exempt gun manufacturers from the
imposition of a duty. "8 Finally, the court determined that the "imposition of a duty
[did] not constitute an impermissible judicial ban on manufacture and sale,"'"19
because "[m]aking an activity tortious forces the people who derive benefit from
it to internalize the costs associated with it, thereby making sure that the activity
will only be undertaken if it is desired by enough people to cover its costs." 2°
After determining that Navegar owed a duty to the plaintiffs to not increase
their risk through negligent advertising and marketing, the court examined the issue
of causation.'' Navegar argued that their conduct was causally unrelated to Ferri's
rampage. 22  The appellate court determined however, that Navegar's media
campaign established causation'23 and that Navegar's sale of the TEC models
presented triable issues of causation. 24 In finding causation as to Navegar's media
campaign, the court analogized Merrill to the Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. '
25
over-promotion case, which involved the prescription of a potentially toxic drug to
a patient who died after ingesting the drug. 26 In Stevens, the manufacturer was
116. The court pointed to the staggering social and medical costs associated with gun violence. See
id. at 169-70. Therefore, the court determined that there was a very strong policy of preventing the
imposition of these costs. See id. at 170. This is a strong argument for municipalities because of the
power of the statistics that they will be able to provide.
117. The court considered the burden to Navegar and the consequences to the community by
imposing a duty of care and liability, and found that societal interests would not be adversely affected
because the manufacture of assault weapons, which have no viable use for recreation or self-defense,
does not have great social utility. See id. at 171. In support of this proposition, the court likens the
imposition of duty on Navegar to asbestos manufacturers. See id. at 172. The court noted that the
social worth of assault weapons was far less than that of asbestos where manufacturers have been held
liable for extremely large damages. See id. As a cautionary measure, the court also noted that the
risk/benefit analysis required in strict liability and negligence is the same. See id. at 175-76.
118. Seeid. at175-76
119. See id. at 178. Additionally, the court relied on the "cheapest cost avoider" theory advanced
by Judge Calabresi. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
120. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178 (quoting McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 169-70 (2nd
Cir. 1997)).
121. Id. at 185.
122. See id. at 186. The plaintiffs, in order to prevail, needed to show that Navegar's conduct was
a substantial factor in bringing about their injuries. See id.
123. See id. at 187.
124. See id. at 188.
125. 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
126. See id.
subjected to liability for over-promoting the drug even though the doctor could not
"remember specific instances in which he received any information, promotional
or otherwise, directly from Parke, Davis... "127 The Merrill court stated that it had
been more difficult in Stevens to find a causal link between the manufacturer's
promotions, the acts of the doctor, and the plaintiff's injury.'28 Therefore, the
Merrill court determined that the evidence presented at trial was no less "conjec-
tural than the... evidence condoned in Parke, Davis to show a causal connection
between the marketing of a potentially dangerous product and its use in a particular
case." 129 As a result, the court refused to dismiss Navegar on the basis that the
plaintiff could not prove that the murderer had read Navegar's ads.130
After establishing that the grant of summary judgment on the issue of ordinary
negligence was in error, 3 ' the court turned to the plaintiff's strict liability claim.3 2
The court determined that the weight of authority in California indicated that
neither the manufacture of guns nor their discharge was an ultrahazardous
activity."' Additionally, strict liability relies on an "inability to eliminate the risk
by the exercise of reasonable care."' 34 Therefore, the court reasoned that a finding
of strict liability would inherently negate the ordinary negligence claim, and vice-
versa.1
35
The California Court of Appeals found triable issues of fact, in connection
with the ordinary negligence claim, that a gun manufacturer had a duty to exercise
reasonable care not to create risks above those already present in firearm use.'36
The key to this case, and perhaps municipal gun manufacturer cases, lies in
how this court framed the gun manufacturer's duty. By holding that Navegar had
a duty to ensure that the risks associated with firearms were not increased and that
this duty was based on special circumstances rather than a relationship, the court
avoided the difficulties befalling most individual gun manufacturer suits.
Therefore, this case may be of substantial value to municipalities in their suits
against gun manufacturers. Not only do the cities have the power of statistics on
their side to resolve the causation question,137 but, by not having to prove the
existence of a special relationship, the cities avoid the necessity of proving
thousands of cases of duty to the injured plaintiffs individually. Furthermore,
127. Id. at 664, n.16.
128. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 189.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 190.
133. Seeid. at 191.
134. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c)).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 152. The dissent argues that, in becoming the first appellate court to find a gun
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a "remote purchaser," the court undertook "an egregious
exercise in judicial legislation." Id. at 193.
137. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text for a discussion on how statistical analysis is a
great benefit to municipality suits.
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Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., provides a masterful display of the California Appellate
Court's ability to reinforce the importance of the ordinary negligence claim.'38
This case was unusual because of the overwhelming direct evidence against
Navegar. Indeed, several portions of the court's analysis turned on the abundant
evidence of Navegar's malfeasance and tortious disregard with respect to their
advertising. 39  Merrill seems to hold that there are limits to marketing and
advertising of legal products." ° Without similar levels of damaging evidence, it
may be hard for future suits to rely on this case. Furthermore, the extension and
innovative use of case law by the Merrill court may not withstand a California
Supreme Court challenge. The dissent echos the traditional rule:.4 there is no
precedent for finding gun manufacturers liable in ordinary negligence.'4 2 The
outcome of Merrill will ultimately depend on whether the California Supreme
Court believes that gun violence is a national epidemic that requires a shared
response from communities, legislatures, and courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The suits brought by municipalities are ordinary tort suits seeking'damages.
The only thing remarkable about these cases is that municipalities are bringing
them. Courts should treat these cases like ordinary suits similar to Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek'43 and Merrill v. Navegar.'" The challenging question that Mark
Barnes 45 raised and that Denise Dunlevy may have to face is whether municipal
suits against gun manufacturers hinge on a political question."' That is, are these
138. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
139. For instance, the court noted on the issue of causation that the evidence presented was enough
to comply with the standard set forth by Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973), and
distinguished adverse caselaw for the same reason. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187, n.31.
140. See id. at 184-85.
141. The dissent strenuously argues that the majority's opinion is nothing more than judicial activism
and legislation and seems to argue for a status quo approach. See id. at 193. The dissent targets the
majority's duty analysis as legal and analytical error because it
posits a definition of duty which is unsupported by precedent... holds, contrary to well-
established precedent, that there may be a duty to protect against the criminal act of a third
party, [and] disregards an unbroken line of appellate precedent in both state and federal courts
declining to impose a duty on gun manufacturers in ordinary negligence actions ......
Id.
142. See id. at 192-93.
143. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
144. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. 1999).
145. Mark Barnes is legal counsel for the National Rifle Association.
146. See David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the Second
Amendment From Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 737, 749 (1995) (stating that the main reason
courts should not hear cases against gun manufacturers when the product does not have a genuine defect
questions better left to the legislature? In response to that question, we should note
that courts since Langridge v. Levy147 in 1836 have dealt with a large number of
suits involving defective guns. The present municipal suits are just a continuation
of the question of how much of the damage caused by guns should be charged back
to the manufacturers. The resolution of the question is going to be left to young
attorneys. It is for them to decide what kind of society in which they want to live;
whether they and their children want to live in fear of needless handgun violence.
Let us begin to face the question.
is that such suits "patently seek a remedy which is appropriately dispensed by the legislature, not the
judiciary"). But see Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599,605 (Mo. 1969), superceded
by statute as stated in, Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989). "It is neither
realistic nor consistent with the common law tradition to wait upon the legislature to correct an
outmoded rule of case law." Id.
147. 2 M. & W. 519 (1837), affd4 M. & W. 337 (1838).
